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third party by bastardizing the child. For this reason
in a number of cases the court has refused to grant
a divorce on the basis of the blood tests alone. In
uncontested divorce actions, however, when the blood
tests exclude paternity, the court has no choice but to
grant the decree."33
In the absence of a new report by the Committee, the
Maryland Legislature or the courts of this State should
not try to be more "scientific" than the scientists.
JAMEs

P. LEWIS

LARRY

H. PoZANEK

The Cy Pres Doctrine Explored
Miller v. Mer.-Safe Dep. & Tr. Co.'
A testator bequeathed the residue of his estate to four
named charitable institutions, one of which had forfeited
its charter subsequent to the drawing of the will. The
Maryland Court of Appeals divided the funds left to the
extinct organization among the remaining three. In so
doing, the Court presented an initial interpretation of the
Maryland cy pres statute, enacted in 1945.2
Cy pres is derived from a Norman-French phrase meaning "as near as." BLACK defines it as "a rule for the construction of instruments in equity, by which the intention
of the party is carried out 'as near as may be,' when it
would be impossible or illegal to give it literal effect."' The
doctrine is applied where a testator, settlor, or donor has
indicated a general charitable intention which is incapable
of being carried out in the specific manner directed; and
the result of its application is the subordination or sacrifice
8Supra, n. 26, pp. 703, 704.
1224 Md. 380, 168 A. 2d 184 (1961).
12 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 16, § 196:
"If a . .. bequest for charity, ait the time it was intended to become effective, is illegal, or impossible or impracticable of enforcement, and if the ... testator, manifested a general intention to devote
the property to charity, a court of equity may, on application of
. any interested person, or the Attorney General of the State,
order an administration of the . . . bequest as nearly as possible to
fulfill the general charitable intention of the . . . testator."
'ELCK'S, LAw DIcTIoNARY

(4th ed. 1951).
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of the specific object to the general one so that the testator's
scheme may be carried out as near to his intention as is
possible.
Cy pres, as a doctrine of law, has been recognized as
devolving from two sources: first, as a prerogative of the
English Crown, which disposed of charitable gifts where
their purpose was unlawful, or where no intention to create
a trust was indicated. 4 Apparently, American courts never
have possessed the prerogative power, although there is
some suggestion that the various state legislatures may
have it.5 The second source of cy pres is the judicial power
possessed by courts of equity as part of their inherent
jurisdiction over charitable trusts.
The majority of American states adopt the cy pres doctrine either by statute or court construction, or both, although its application to certain situations may vary among
them.'
Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Charitable Trusts
Administration Act 7 in 1931, Maryland expressly rejected
the doctrine; and, after its passage, no occasion was presented for a ruling on the question until the instant case.
The long history of judicial rejection was based primarily
on the exclusion from the Maryland common law of the
Statute of 43 Eliz. I., c.4.8 Although this ancient statute
did little more than establish a procedure for enforcing
gifts for charitable uses it had been initially interpreted
by the United States Supreme Court as being the basis of
the law of charitable trusts.9 Despite the subsequent modi' BOGERT, TRUSTS

(3d ed. 1952) ch. 17, § 147.

Id., 570.

loc. cit. supra, n. 4; 4 ScoTT, TRUSTS (2d ed. 1956) § 397.3.
'2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 16, § 196.
8Book Depository v. Trustees, 117 Md. 86, 91, 83 A. 50 (1912) ; Dashiell
OBOGERT,

v. Attorney General, 5 H. & J. 392 (Md. 1822). See,
MD. ANNO. (1940) § 399, p. 239.

RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS,

'Baptist Association v. Hart's Ex'rs., 4 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1819). The
Court there held that the enforcement of charitable trusts could be only
by virtue of the Statute of 43 Eliz. I., c. 4 or the prerogative power of the
Crown, and not by the inherent powers of a court of equity. Thus, it
reasoned that, absent these two sources, a charitable trust whose beneficiary was vague and indefinite was incapable of enforcement. Cf. Vidal
v. Girard's Executors, 2 How. 127 (U.S. 1844), wherein the Court, upon
further investigation, decided that the interpretation given to the Statute
of 43 Eliz. I., c. 4 in the Baptist case was incorrect, and that the inherent
powers of a court of equity were sufficient to enforce a charitable trust
independent of the Statute. In reversing the ruling of the earlier case, it
was noted that:
"[T]he court came to the conclusion that, at the common law, no
donation to charity could be enforced in chancery . . . where both

of these defects occurred (referring to a donation to trustees incapable
of taking and beneficiaries uncertain and indefinite). The Court said:
'We find no dictum that charities could be established on such an
information (by the attorney-general) where the conveyance was de-
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fication of this ruling by the Supreme Court, the Maryland
Court of Appeals, having accepted the first construction by
the Supreme Court, continued to hold that the equity
courts had no inherent power to enforce devises to charity
independent of the statute."°
In 1844, the Court of Appeals held that where trust
property is reposed in a municipal corporation for a charity
within the scope of its duties, a court of chancery will
prevent the misapplication of the trust funds, and compel
the execution of the trust, stating further that "this jurisdiction is not founded upon the Statute of 43 Elizabeth, but
is part of the original inherent jurisdiction of the Court of
Chancery over the subject of trusts."" This language,
which was directed at the possibility of misapplication of
trust funds, was later interpreted as meaning that where
there are parties capable of taking the res, and the objects
are legal and definite, a court of equity may "take cognizance of and enforce the trust . .. though the object of
the trust be in its nature charitable." 12 Finally, the Court
made a clear break with the Baptist interpretation, and
stated:
"The Statute of 43 Elizabeth in regard to charities, is
not, it is true, in force here, but it is well settled that
a court of chancery, has jurisdiction, independent altogether of the statute, to enforce a trust for charitable
and religious purposes, provided the devise or bequest
be made to a person or body corporate capable of
taking and holding the property so devised and bequeathed, and provided, further, the object3 and character of the trust be definite and certain."'
fective or the donation was so vaguely expressed that the donee, if
not charity, would be incapable of taking.' * * * There are, however,
dicta of eminent judges . . . which do certainly support the doctrine
that charitable uses might be enforced in chancery upon the general
jurisdiction of the Court, independently of the statute of 43 of
Elizabeth; and that the jurisdiction has been acted upon not only
subsequently but antecedent to that statute."
10Rizer v. Perry, 58 Md. 112 (1882) ; Church Extens'n M. E. Ch. v. Smith,
56 Md. 362, 396 (1881); Dumfries v. Abercrombie, 46 Md. 172 (1876);
Needles v. Martin, 33 Md. 609 (1871) ; State, Use of M. E. Church v.
Warren, 28 Md. 352 (1867) ; Missionary Soc. v. Reynolds, 9 Md. 341 (1856) ;
Wilderman v. Baltimore, 8 Md. 551 (1855) ; Dashiell v. Attorney General,
5 H. & J. 392 (Md. 1822) ; Trippe v. Frazier, et ux. et al., 4 H. & J. 446
(Md. 1815). See RESTATEMENT, TRuSTS, MD. ANNO. (1940) ch. 11, Introductory Note, pp. 230-234.
n Barnum v. Baltimore, 62 Md. 275, 299-300 (1884).
2 Crisp v. Crisp, 65 Md. 422, 427, 5 A. 421 (1886).
" Halsey v. Con. Prot. Epis. Church, 75 Md. 275, 281-282, 23 A. 781
(1892).

19621

MILLER V. MER.-SAFE DEP. & TR. CO.

343

Notwithstanding this self-asserted power, the Court was
often disposed to hold charitable trusts void for uncertainty
either as to recipient or object - thus precluding effective application of the judicial power. 4 In an attempt to
remove this objection to the enforcement of charitable
trusts, the Legislature, in 1888, enacted Article 93, Section
315.'" The Court, however, refused to construe this Act as
broadening the previously established law beyond its own
specific terms, and struck down any charitable trust not
strictly in accordance therewith. 6 This situation continued
until Article 16, Section 195,11 enacted in 1931, conferred
jurisdiction on the equity courts to enforce charitable
trusts, including trusts for those purposes defined in 43
Elizabeth I., c.4. The Court of Appeals subsequently treated
this statute as eliminating the indefiniteness of beneficiaries
and objects as a problem;' and, as suggested in the instant
case, it may have conferred sufficient authority for the
courts to apply cy pres, 9 although no case involving the
doctrine arose between its enactment and the passage of
the Uniform Act.
Once having accepted cy pres as a general doctrine, the
question of its scope is then presented. Specifically, there
is an apparent, though possibly not an actual, conflict as
to whether cy pres is applicable only to charitable trusts
or extends to charitable gifts not in trust. Most of the
cases involving cy pres have been based on trusts, and the
courts have been inclined to speak of the doctrine as applicable to trusts without mentioning or distinguishing its
applicability to gifts not in trust. Some courts, however,
See, e.g., Church Extens'n M. E. Ch. v. Smith, 56 Md. 362 (1881).

'58

MD. CODE

(1957) Art. 93, § 357:

"No devise or bequest of real or personal property for any charitable
uses shall be deemed . . . void by reason of any uncertainty with
respect to the donees thereof, provided the will.. . making the same
shall also contain directions for the formation of a corporation to take
the same, within the period of twelve calendar months from the
grant of probate of such will ... "
16See Yingling v. Miller, 77 Md. 104, 107, 26 A. 491 (1893), where the
Court stated:
"Now, remembering the settled law of this State prior to the
legislation of 1888, namely, that this bequest would have been void
for uncertainty . . . can we assume that the Legislature intended, by
the language just quoted, to set aside entirely the long established
policy of this State in regard to charitable bequests and devises, and
practically to enact here the Statute of Elizabeth? We find nothing in
section 305A which, we think, will justify us in concluding the Legislature intended to make such a radical change."
See also Chase v. Stockett, 72 Md. 239 (1890).
112 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 16, § 195.
'Rabinowitz v. Woliman, 174 Md. 6, 197 A. 566 (1938).
19
Miller v. Mer.-Safe Dep. & Tr. Co., supra, n. 1, 385-6. Cf. RE TATEMENT,
TnuSTS, MD. ANNO. (1940) § 399, p. 239.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXII

have used language from which it may be inferred that
the doctrine is applicable only to trusts." In the instant
case, the Maryland Court of Appeals construed the Uniform
Act "as applicable to an absolute bequest to a charitable
corporation as it is to a bequest in trust."'"
A review of the cases dealing with cy pres indicates
that the doctrine will be applied only where the court
determines that the testator's general intention was charitable in nature and that the particular recipient, or the
means of execution of his plan, was of secondary importance. This consideration, which is the raison d'etre of the
doctrine, is the most difficult to resolve, as it involves an
examination of the mental state of a person no longer
living. Often, the courts look first to the instrument itself,
as did the Maryland Court which paid particular attention
to the following: 22
1. The proportion of the entire estate left to charity;
2. The proportion of the residuary estate left to
charity;
3. The presence or absence of a gift over;
4. The presence or absence of an in terrorem clause;
5. The type of alternate distribution which may be
suggested.
Generally, however, the courts are also inclined to
examine the reported statements and conduct of the testator or donor as further evidence of his general and primary
intentions. The weight put upon such evidence probably
depends on how clear an answer may be obtained from a
reading of the instrument itself. The difficulty in relying
on evidence of this character is that it is often susceptible
to several interpretations and may lead the court into
adopting a more obvious construction to the exclusion of
a less obvious but equally significant one. An illustration
of this is seen in a recent New Jersey case where the Court
was called upon to construe a will wherein a sizeable bequest, including the entire residuary estate, was left in
trust to Amherst College for use as a scholarship loan fund
20Thurlow v. Berry, 249 Ala. 597, 32 So. 2d 526 (1947) ; In re Faulkner's
Estate, 128 Cal. App. 2d 575, 272 P. 2d 818 (1954) ; In re Lowe's Estate,
117 Ind. App. 554, 70 N.E. 2d 187 (1946). These cases did not involve interpretation of the Uniform Act.
21 Supra, n. 19, 387, citing Rabinowitz v. Wollman, 8upra, n. 18, which
dealt with an interpretation of the 1931 Act, supra, n. 17.
Supra, n. 19, 388-390.
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for "deserving American born, Protestant, Gentile boys of
good moral repute." Amherst declined to accept the trust
unless the religious restrictions were removed.2 3 In attempting to determine whether the primary intention of
the testator was to benefit Amherst or a particular class
of students, the Court, after considering a relatively unindicative will, had to rely on the fact that the testator was
an Amherst alumnus, attended alumni meetings, and gave
modest donations to the school. Equally as convincing, but
brushed aside by the majority of the Court, was evidence
of testator's affiliation with a Protestant sect and his donations thereto. In so weighing the evidence, the New Jersey
Supreme Court directed that the funds go to Amherst without the religious restrictions. A strong dissenting opinion
suggested that the testator's primary intention was to benefit the particular class of students, and that such intention
could best be achieved by substituting another trustee for
Amherst and allowing the restrictions to stand.
From the numerous cases in which cy pres has been in
issue, a general pattern of at least six basic situations is
discernible, namely:
1. The funds available for the particular
purpose are
24
insufficient to fulfill that purpose;
2. The particular charity intended to be benefited has
lost its existence prior to the time when the bequest

becomes effective ;25

3. The particular charity loses its
existence after the
26
bequest has become effective;
4. The particular charity intended to be benefited
2
refuses the bequest; 1
5. The bequest, if executed as intended, would be

illegal ;28
6. The bequest, if executed as intended would be impractical or, because of changed conditions, would
not serve to carry out the intention of the testator.2 9
Howard Savings Inst. of Newark v. Peep, 34 N.J. 494, 170 A. 2d 39,
41 (1961).
Fairbanks v. City of Appleton, 249 Wis. 476, 24 N.W. 2d 893 (1946).
Supra, n. 19; In re McIlvain's Estate, 44 Berks. 173 (Pa. 1954).
Carr v. Trustees of Lane Seminary, 43 N.E. 2d 648 (Ohio 1936).
First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Elliott, 406 Ill. 44, 92 N.E. 2d 66 (1950);
Howard Savings Inst. of Newark v. Peep, supra, n. 23.
2In
re Week's Estate, 154 Kan. 103, 114 P. 2d 857 (1941) ; In re Fowler's
Estate, 43 N.Y.S. 2d 94 (1943) aff'd., 50 N.Y.S. 2d 174 (1944).
"In re Swope's Estate, 121 N.Y.S. 2d 181 (1953) where impracticality
was caused when the specific itheological seminary named as beneficiary
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In each of the above situations, once the court determines that the testator's charitable intention was general
in nature, the disposition of the case normally depends on
what alternatives are available by which this intention can
be effectuated; i.e., what alternatives are cy pres - as near
as - the testator's stated desires as will satisfy the court.
In the first situation, the cases generally involve a
bequest for the construction and/or maintenance of some
institution in accordance with specific plans, and the funds
provided therefor are insufficient to accomplish that goal.
If another institution exists which is reasonably close in
character (curriculum, services offered, admission policy,
etc.) to the intended beneficiary, several courts have directed the funds to such existing institution." The Maryland Court, applying Virginia law, has employed this
method." Even where no similar institutions exist, the
strong tendency to avoid the failure of charitable trusts has
led some courts to direct the funds to existing dissimilar
institutions under conditions which would approximate the
testator's intention. 2
Cases involving the extinction of the particular charity
intended to be benefited prior to the vesting of the trust
or gift have been treated similar to situations where the
charity has lost its existence after the trust or gift has
vested. Where the extinct charity is one of a class to which
the funds are to be or have been applied, the court may
divide its share among the remaining institutions if they
are similar to the one which became extinct, although
there is apparently no rule which compels the court to do
this." As in all cases where the doctrine is applied, the
nearest mode of execution to the testator's general intention is what is required. Where the intended recipient has
merged with another institution, the decision is based upon
the proximity of purpose of the new or resulting institution
to that of the old one. 4 Where another institution exists
similar in purpose, the courts have directed the funds to
fell under Chinese Communist control; Towne Estate, 75 D. & C. 215 (Pa.
1951).
31Fairbanks v. City of Appleton, supra, n. 24; see also Estate of McKee,
378 Pa. 607, 108 A. 2d 214 (1954); In re Wanamaker's Estate, 364 Pa.
248, 72 A. 2d 106 (1950) ; In re Williams' Estate, 353 Pa. 638, 46 A. 2d
237 (1946).
81Fletcher v. Safe Deposit & Tr. Co., 193 Md. 400, 416, 67 A. 2d 386
(1949).
3In re Ashbridge's Estate, 61 D. & C. 279 (Pa. 1948); Of. Howard
Savings Inst. of Newark v. Peep, supra,n. 23.
In re McIlvain's Estate, supra, n. 25; Dobbin's Estate, 74 D. & C. 106
(Pa. 1951).
In re Nuckol's Estate, 197 Oki. 175, 184 P. 2d 778 (1947); Wellford
v. Powell, 197 Va. 685, 90 S.E. 2d 791 (1956).
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that charity.3 5 In situations where several of these possibilities exist, the court must examine the merits of each
basing its ultimate decision on the relative proximity of
each to the testator's intention, and it may withhold a
decision until an appointed committee has studied the possibilities and rendered a report. 6
The applicability of cy pres in cases where the particular mode of execution is illegal depends largely on the
extent of the illegality. Illegality itself as a grounds for
the use of cy pres is recognized in the Uniform Act, 7 although several courts have used the term "inexpediency"
in its place when speaking of the doctrine."' Generally,
where recognized as a reason for applying cy pres, the
illegality must not affect the trust or gift itself, but only
the particular recipient. The situation where acceptance of
the trust is nugatory because of invalid conditions, in which
cy pres was applied, must be contrasted with the case
where the gift itself was void under a statute expressly
prohibiting the general type of gift involved.3 9 It has also
been held that cy pres cannot be applied to validate a
charitable trust which is void under a statute invalidating
such trusts if created within a stated period prior to the
settlor's death. 0
The application of cy pres where, because of a change
in circumstances, the execution of the scheme as originally
intended by the testator would be impractical, or would
not serve to satisfy his intention depends primarily on the
relative nearness to the original desire of the altered stated
recipient and the available alternatives. Where trust funds
intended to be used for the purchase of fuel for indigent
families of a certain village were sought to be diverted to
the maintenance of the village cemetery on grounds that
there were no indigent families left in the village and that,
for the preceding three years there had been no need to
In re Zuck's Estate, 33 Erie 237 (Pa. 1953).
Estate of McKee, supra, n. 30. The Pennsylvania Court here withheld
final disposition of the case for 50 years.
2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 16, § 196.
SAllen Adm'r. v. City of Bellefontaine, 47 Ohio App. 359, 191 N.E.
896 (1934) ; Village of Hinsdale v. Chicago City Missionary Soc., 375 Ill.
220, 30 N.E. 2d 657 (1940).
'*Cf. In re Week's Estate, supra, n. 28, and In re Walter's Estate, 172
Misc. 207 (1939), 15 N.Y.S. 2d 8, aff'd., 21 N.Y.S. 2d 37 (1940) mod. 285
N.Y. 158, 33 N.E. 2d 72, 133 A.L.R. 1283 (1941).
40 In
re Fowler's Estate, supra, n. 28. Section 12 of the Personal Property Law, and Section 113 of the Real Property Law of New York (the
counterparts to Sections 195 and 196 of Article 16) validate only those
charitable gifts which are otherwise valid. Thus, the New York Court
reasoned that since the gift there was invalid under another statute
rendering such gifts invalid if made within two months prior to donor's
death, it could not be saved by application of cy pres.
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purchase fuel, a Pennsylvania court refused to apply the
doctrine.4 The cases in this area are based on such divergent factual situations that precedents are not likely to be
found, and decisions usually rest on the general established
requirements of cy pres as applied to the particular facts.
It should be noted that cy pres was not intended to be
applied, and will not be applied where the trust or will
provides for a specific alternate distribution effective on
the failure of the primary charitable gift.4 2 The principle
of the doctrine is that the court should ascertain and effectuate as nearly as possible the testator's true intention,
without substituting its own judgment for that of the
testator, or creating a fictional testamentary intent.
Maryland is in an enviable position in regard to the cy
pres doctrine. In so far as its statute requires that it be
interpreted in harmony with the interpretation given by
other states which have enacted it, the Maryland courts
have available decisions from other states to guide their
deliberations. Furthermore, as a latecomer to the discussion, the Maryland courts, in areas of conflict, have the
opportunity to choose from among the earlier decisions
those which they find to be the better reasoned.
ALAN M. WILNER
Interpretation Of 'Statutes To Avoid Constitutional
Questions Re Labor Union Political Contributions
Machinistsv. Street'
A number of railroad carriers had begun work under a
union shop contract as authorized by a 1951 amendment,
Section 2 Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act.' Under the
agreements with the union, every employee of the railroad
was required to pay, as a condition of continued employment, all assessments and dues that were normally required of union members of his particular class or trade.
"In re Vogan's Estate, 75 D. & C. 531 (Pa. 1951).
Camden Trust 0o. v. Christ's Home of Warminster, Pa., 28 N.J. Super.
466, 101 A. 2d 84 (1953) ; Village of Hinsdale v. Chicago City Missionary
Soc., supra, n. 38.
' 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
'64 STAT. 1238, 45 U.S.C.A. § 152 Eleventh (1951). This section provides
for a permi88ive union shop, and was held constitutional on its face in
Railway Employees' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956) on the grounds it
(a) was a legitimate exercise of Congress' power to regulate interstate
commerce and (b) did not violate the First Amendment or the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment.

